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AN ACCOMMODATION OF PRIVACY INTERESTS
AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
IN PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
In the eighty-six years since Warren and Brandeis, in "that
most influential law review article of all,"' first argued that the
right of privacy was protected at common law, the right has been
dissected,2 reconstituted, 3 and analyzed in great detail.4 The
twentieth century has seen an increasing acceptance of this
right,5 one aspect of which involves the publication of true but
"private" information about an individual.6 Today a large major-
I Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The article
is so described in Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 327 (1966).
2 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
3 Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity].
I See, e.g., authorities cited notes 1-3 supra; Bloustein, The First Amendment and Pri-
vacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy]; Bloustein, Privacy, Tort
Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?,
46 TEXAS L. REv. 611 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the
Constitution]; Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on
Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107 (1963); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
935 (1968); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093 (1962).
' Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975).
6 Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the
individual what Judge Cooley calls the right "to be let alone." Instantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make
good the prediction that "what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the housetops." . . . [T]he question whether our law will recognize and
protect the right to privacy in this and in other respects must soon come be-
fore our courts for consideration.
Of the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some such protection,
there can, it is believed, be no doubt.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1 at 195.
This facet of the privacy right is the subject of this Comment, although Prosser has
analyzed the right of privacy as involving "four distinct kinds of invasion of four differ-
ent interests of the plaintiff." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at
804 (4th ed. 1971). In addition to public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff,
they are: (1) "the appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantages, of the
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ity of states provide protection against at least some forms of
invasion of privacy, including public disclosure of private facts;
7
this state law protection has been based variously on the common
law,8 state constitutional provisions,9 and the precedents of other
jurisdictions. 10
On the other hand, recent decades also have seen increased
emphasis on the protection of the first amendment rights of free
speech and press. In particular, the early 1950's saw the de-
velopment of a general first amendment theory built around an
approach that has been called "ad hoc balancing";" any speech
could be regulated on the basis of content if the state's interest in
such regulation, which was presumptively given great weight,
was found to be more important than the interest promoted by
the type of speech regulated. 12 Since that time protection under
the first amendment has increased under more fragmented
plaintiff's name or likeness, ' id.; (2) "intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or
seclusion" or by physical interference, eavesdropping, wiretapping, or the like, id. 807;
and (3) "publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye," id. 812.
Bloustein, who maintains that the right of privacy protects a single interest in self-
determination, see note 64 infra & accompanying text, has written that Warren and
Brandeis' object was to prevent public disclosure of private facts. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort
Law, and the Constitution, supra note 4, at 616.
The Comment, in considering the public disclosure aspect, is also not concerned
with disclosure in violation of a confidential relationship, which might better be clas-
sified as a specialized aspect of the right against intrusion. See, e.g., Banks v. King
Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Doe v. Roe, 42 App. Div. 2d
559, 345 N.Y.S.2d560, aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307 N.E.2d 823, 352 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1973),
opinion amended, 34 N.Y.2d 562, 310 N.E.2d 539, 354 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1974), cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 420 U.S. 307 (1975).
7 Recent surveys show the right to be "recognized and accepted in all but a very
few jurisdictions," and explicitly rejected in only four states. W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
§ 117, at 804.
That some states have not had the opportunity to recognize all forms of invasion is
not critical, because state courts have routinely used decisions protecting against one
form of invasion as precedents in decisions protecting against another. See, e.g., Cason
v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945), second appeal, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635
(1947); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 36, 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973), rev'd, 420
U.S. 469 (1975). The state court in Cox traced Georgia's right to privacy back to a 1905
precedent, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), an
appropriation and false light case in which the plaintiff prevailed on a claim that the
insurance company had used his photograph and a fabricated endorsement in an ad-
vertisement. For a similar New York development, see note 91, infra.
IE.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 771-73, 299 S.W. 967, 969-71 (1927).
9E.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 291, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931).
10 E.g., Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 303-05, 162 P.2d 133,
138 (1945).
11 See Nimmer, supra note 4, at 938-41.
12 See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 91
(1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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theories which permit the states to protect only what the Su-
preme Court finds are particularly strong interests, such as those
furthered by libel and obscenity statutes. Speech which the
states may constitutionally regulate has sometimes been classi-
fied as "unprotected. 1 3 Even in cases of permitted state regula-
tion, the protected interest and the permitted infringement on
speech must be precisely defined; speech not falling within the
area of permissible state regulation, that is, speech which is not
"unprotected," must have sufficient "breathing space" so that it
is not "chilled."14 These developments in the law have produced
a direct conflict between a state's right to protect individuals
from public disclosures of private facts and the press' first
amendment right to publish truthful information.
Until recently, the question whether the first amendment
restricts a state's power to protect individuals from public dis-
closures of private facts was very rarely raised in explicit con-
stitutional terms.1 5 From the beginning, however, Warren and
Brandeis, recognizing the possible conflict between a right to
such protection and the press' reporting function, theorized
that the privacy right did not extend to prohibition of "matter
which is of public or general interest.' 6 Courts recognizing a
privacy right against public disclosure adopted this qualification
that the state's protection of the right to privacy did not extend
to matters which were "newsworthy"'17 or of "public interest.'
8
The extent of this privilege to report matters of public in-
terest varied, however. Warren and Brandeis, certainly, put little
stock in the press' ability to determine what were legitimately
matters of public interest; they intended that the right of privacy
would protect against the "overstepping" of the press in printing
"3 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). For a discussion of the two possible meanings of
"unprotected" speech, see note 122, infra.
'4 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
15 Although it has been stated that as of 1973 no public disclosure case had raised
the first amendment as a defense protecting the press' right to disclose publicly "pri-
vate" facts, Comment, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462, 1469 n.36
(1973), at least one earlier case does discuss the press' rights under the first amend-
ment. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942). Before Cox Broad-
casting Corp., 420 U.S. 469 (1975), however, nearly all cases focused on the press' pro-
tection under state law rather than the first amendment.
"I Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
17 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); Hubbard v.
Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962).
'See, e.g., Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948); Waters v. Fleetwood,
212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956).
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"unseemly gossip" rather than in restricting itself to "matters of
real interest to the community."'19 The early cases, however,
tended to find a more generous privilege, essentially allowing
the press to determine what was in the public interest by what it
chose to print or broadcast.2 0 A more sophisticated state law test
has also developed under which the court finds a privilege to
invade privacy not where the event or even the private facts
disclosed are of public interest, but only where linking the
disclosures to the specific identified individual is of public
interest.
2 '
During its 1974-75 Term the Supreme Court, in Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn,22 for the first time decided a case involving
public disclosure of truthful but "private" facts. Plaintiff's
daughter was raped and did not survive the incident; six youths
were arrested and indicted for rape and murder. The details of
the attack and the arrests received heavy coverage in the local
news media, but the victim's name was not disclosed by the press,
perhaps because of a state statute prohibiting publication of the
name of a rape victim, 23 but also perhaps because of the
defendant's internal policy against such disclosure.24 At trial
eight months later the murder charges were dropped and five of
the six youths pleaded guilty to rape or attempted rape. The
broadcasting company's reporter, seeing the victim's name on
the copy of the indictment made available to him at the trial by
the court clerk, broadcast the name in his report of the trial.25
19 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast
in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon col-
umn is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon
the domestic circle.
20 Some courts held that the privilege extended to all details of a generally news-
worthy event, without analyzing whether all of the details, such as the identities of
participants, were themselves newsworthy. Actions for invasion of privacy were barred
in cases in which photographs were printed of an identifiable grieving husband at the
scene of his wife's suicide and of an identifiable shocked wife after she had witnessed
the murder of her husband, on the grounds that the suicide and murder were events of
public interest. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491
(1939); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929).
21 See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
22 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
23 Id. at 471-72.
24 Appendix at 18, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (affidavit
of Thomas Wassell).
25 420 U.S. at 473-74.
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The Georgia Supreme Court held that the defendants' pub-
lic disclosure of the name of plaintiff's daughter gave rise to
a cause of action for invasion of privacy under the state's com-
mon law.26 The defendants contended that the disclosure was
privileged at common law because it concerned a matter of pub-
lic interest and, further, that it was protected by the first
amendment. In response to the common law defense the court
held that the state criminal statute prohibiting disclosure of a
rape victim's name27 was a conclusive statement of state policy
that such a disclosure was not a matter of public interest.28 On
the constitutional issue the court held: "There simply is no pub-
lic interest or general concern about the identity of the victim of
such a crime as will make the right to disclose the identity of the
victim rise to the level of First Amendment protection. 29
The United States Supreme Court, recognizing the confron-
tation between the privacy right protecting against public dis-
closure of private facts and the press' first amendment right to
publish accurate reports,3 0 reversed the Georgia court on the
narrower ground that the reporter's source for the victim's name
was an official record kept in connection with a judicial proceed-
ing and available for public inspection. Relying on the press'
privilege to report judicial proceedings and the presumed public
interest in all official records made available for public inspec-
tion by the state, the Court held that the first amendment,
operating through the fourteenth, prohibits a civil action for
26 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 62, 200 S.E.2d 127, 130, rehearing
denied, 231 Ga. 67, 200 S.E.2d 133 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The Georgia
court, reversing summary judgment for plaintiff on the question of liability, remanded
the case for a jury determination whether defendants "invaded [plaintiff's] privacy with
wilful or negligent disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the invasion
highly offensive." Id. at 64, 200 S.E.2d at 131.
27 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and
publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of pub-
lic dissemination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or
disseminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or other publication pub-
lished in this State or through any radio or television broadcast originating in
the State the name or identity of any female who may have been raped or
upon whom an assault with intent to commit rape may have been made. Any
person or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall, upon con-
viction, be punished as for a misdemeanor.
28 231 Ga. at 61, 68-69, 200 S.E.2d at 129, 134.
29 Id. at 68, 200 S.E.2d at 134.
3' "Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information,
whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to
an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional
freedoms of speech and press. The face-off is apparent ...." 420 U.S. at 489.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1385
invasion of privacy based on the dissemination of information
obtained from official public records.31
This Comment will address the broader question left open
in Cox; that is, the general accommodation of the individual's
right under state law to be protected from public disclosure of
private facts and the press' right under the first amendment to
publish or broadcast truthful information. These two sets of con-
flicting interests will be analyzed, and their crucial components
extracted and placed in the framework of a new test designed to
afford maximum protection to both sets of interests. To achieve
this accommodation, however, it will first be necessary to ex-
amine the current status of the state law public disclosure tort
and of constitutional protection of the press.
II. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE STATE-PROTECTED RIGHT
The public disclosure tort, according to Dean Prosser's
analysis, has three elements. First, the disclosure must be "pub-
lic"; that is, there must be exposure to the public at large.32 If a
friend of the putative plaintiff, knowing a "private" fact about
him, merely told another friend, there would be no cause of
action; but if the friend disclosed the fact to a reporter and the
reporter published it, there would then be a public disclosure.
Second, the facts disclosed must be "private" ones. Prior
disclosure to a wide enough audience, by the affected individual
or by another with his consent, bars an action for a subsequent
public disclosure, because the information would no longer be
private at the time of the later disclosure. 33 One need not keep a
fact secret from everyone to maintain its "privateness. '34 An in-
dividual confiding to a friend that he is a homosexual does not
3 Id. at 494-95.
32 See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 117, at 810. Warren and Brandeis suggested a
distinction between oral and written disclosures, partly on the ground that, "as long as
gossip was oral, it spread, as regards any one individual, over a very small area, and was
confined to the immediate circle of his acquaintances. It did not reach, or but rarely
reached, those who knew nothing of him. It did not make his name, or his walk, or his
conversation familiar to strangers." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 217 n.4
(quoting Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: To his Reputation, SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE, July,
1890, at 66). With the birth of the broadcast media the requirement that the disclosure
be public can now be met by radio or television broadcast as well as by publication in
print. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 117, at 810.
11 See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 117, at 810-11. "The right to privacy ceases upon
the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent." Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 1, at 218.
" "[A] private communication of [sic] circulation for a restricted purpose is not a
publication within the meaning of the law." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 218
(footnote omitted).
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make that fact other than "private"; but if he announces it at a
rally open to the public the information is no longer "private,"
and subsequent disclosure by the press, therefore, is not action-
able.
Third, the fact disclosed "must be one which would be of-
fensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary
sensibilities."35 Liability has therefore been predicated on public
disclosure of details of sexual activities36 or of a sordid or crimi-
nal past,37 but
[a]ny one who is not a hermit must expect the more or
less casual observation of his neighbors and the passing
public as to what he is and does, and some reporting of
his daily activities. The ordinary reasonable man does not
take offense at mention in a newspaper of the fact that
he has returned from a visit or gone camping in the
woods, or that he has given a party at his house for his
friends .... The law of privacy is not intended for the
protection of any shrinking soul who is abnormally sensi-
tive about such publicity.
3 8
A showing of all three elements of the public disclosure tort,
however, is not conclusive as to liability. Once the elements of
the tort are made out, the press may still assert the affirmative
defense that the disclosure is privileged because it concerns a
public figure39 or a matter of public interest.4 1 The danger in
this approach is that sole reliance on the public interest test can
lead to either a lack of protection for individual privacy interests
or a lack of protection for the press, depending on how "public
interest" is defined, and who is charged with defining it.41
35 W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 117, at 811. "[It is only the more flagrant breaches
of decency and propriety that could in practice be reached, and it is not perhaps desir-
able even to attempt to repress everything which the nicest taste and keenest sense of
the respect due to private life would condemn." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at
216. 3 6 See Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); War-
ren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
37 See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
38 Prosser, supra note 2, at 396-97 (footnote omitted).
"9See, e.g., Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 216, 20 So. 2d 243, 251 (1945), second
appeal, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 118, at 823-24.
4 See, e.g., Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 229, 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (1929);
W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 118, at 823, 824-26. The public interest and public figure
privileges turn out to be equivalent in the case of the public disclosure tort. See text
accompanying notes 188-90 infra.
41 See text accompanying notes 100-05 infra.
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Some courts, possibly attempting to formulate tests that
could take more equal account of the conflicting press and pri-
vacy interests, have allowed recovery even where the subject mat-
ter of the disclosure was of public interest. They have done so
either by applying a stricter-than-usual test for the public in-
terest defense, requiring that the identification of the plaintiff be
itself of public interest, or by balancing the two conflicting sets of
interests against each other.
An example of the first type of case is Melvin v. Reid,42 in
which the plaintiff, a former prostitute, had been acquitted in a
trial for murder, married, and was "entirely rehabilitated.
43
Seven years after the trial a movie was produced depicting the
plaintiff's former life, including the murder allegation and trial,
and using her actual maiden name. The court held that, absent
the use of the name, the movie would be absolutely protected
because the public had a right to know of such occurrences; that
right could have been equally well fulfilled without the use of the
plaintiff's name, however, and therefore its use was "not jus-
tified," and the movie not privileged.
44
The balancing approach was illustrated in Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Association.45 The defendant had published an article con-
cerning the substantial losses to American business caused by
truck hijacking. One paragraph of the article described a typical
hijacking which had taken place eleven years earlier. It identified
the plaintiff, who had been convicted and had since reformed, as
one of the hijackers. Although finding that "reports of the facts
of past crimes are newsworthy," the court held that the arti-
cle was not privileged because "identification of the actor in re-
ports of long past crimes usually serves little independent
public purpose."46 In determining public interest the court
"consider[ed] '[1] the social value of the facts published, [2] the
depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and
[3] the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a po-
sition of public notoriety.' 47
These two examples of deviation from the absolute public
interest standard are encouraging signs of the courts' recogni-
tion that some privacy interests are important enough to war-
42 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
43 1d. at 286, 297 P. at 91.
44 Id. at 290-92, 297 P. at 93.
45 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
46Id. at 537, 483 P.2d at 39-40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72 (emphasis in original).
47 Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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rant protection even in the face of countervailing first amend-
ment interests. 48 But the danger of unjustifiably infringing on
the rights of the press is not to be trifled with. If a test for
liability in public disclosure cases is to allow recovery even where
some public interest in the disclosure is present, such a test must
be very carefully constructed. It must encompass only those nar-
rowly defined privacy interests that truly require strict protec-
tion, and at the same time meet the constitutional require-
ments of adequate first amendment protection for the press.
In order to determine the ideal structure for such a test, and
before attempting to create a framework which will accommo-
date both sets of interests, it will be necessary to determine just
what narrowly defined privacy interests are important enough
to receive protection, and then to determine the current re-
quirements of the first amendment.
III. PRIVACY INTERESTS AFFECTED BY
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Warren and Brandeis subsumed the right to privacy they
contended had developed at common law under the broader
"right 'to be let alone' 49 and the right to an "inviolate
personality."50 These phrases have often been used since to de-
scribe the right protected by the public disclosure tort and the
other forms51 of invasion of privacy. It has not been made clear,
however, exactly what individual interests are affected by the
various forms of invasion.
Warren and Brandeis began with the principle that "[t]he
common law secures to each individual the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
48 The two tests may sometimes be interchangeable and need not always result in
liability for the press. In Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940), a magazine article's detailed disclosure of a former child
prodigy's distant, and previously well-publicized, past was found not actionable. The
court held that although Sidis had since sought obscurity, twenty-five years earlier he
had been a public figure, thus making "his subsequent history, containing as it did the
answer to the question of whether or not he had fulfilled his early promise ... still a
matter of public concern." Id. at 809. The court's decision could be based on the theory
that the disclosure was related to an aspect of Sidis' life as a public figure and therefore
was a matter of public interest. See id. Alternatively, the court may have balanced the
interests involved and found that the facts disclosed were not sufficiently offensive
to outweigh the public interest in disclosure. See id. Either theory would exonerate de-
fendant; which one the court relied on is not clear.
49 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
5 0 Id. 205.
51 Prosser has described four separate classes of tort under the general heading of
"privacy." See Prosser, supra note 2, at 389-92, 398-407.
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shall be communicated to others. '52 This protection, they urged,
rested on a more general right to privacy which extended similar
protection "to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to per-
sonal relations, domestic or otherwise."53 In short, they cham-
pioned a right which gave the individual dominion over how, to
whom, and to what extent his likeness, his words, his description,
and his history were to be disclosed.
54
This right to control the release of information about one-
self is broader than the set of interests affected by public disclo-
sures. For example, if A discovers in B's desk a diary of personal
information that B has shared with no one, A has violated B's
right to keep information about himself secret from the whole
world. If it is never made public, however, the interests specifi-
cally affected by public disclosures are not affected (although
other "privacy" interests are, and may be protected by an action
for trespass or intrusion). On the other hand, if B has shown his
diary to a small circle of friends and one of them makes the
diary public, then the public disclosure does affect a certain
group of interests, even though other privacy interests are unaf-
fected. The problem, then, is to analyze the general interest in
controlling the release of information about oneself, in order to
discover just what narrow group of interests is affected by the act
of publicizing information about an individual without his con-
sent.
It is suggested that three specific privacy interests affected
by public disclosures can be identified: (1) an interest in retain-
ing actual control over the release of information about oneself,
for the sake of one's dignity and individuality; (2) an interest in
preserving intact (or not, as one sees fit) one's relationships with
others; and (3) an interest in how the public perceives one, or
reputation.
The commentator who has done the most searching analysis
of the privacy interests protected by the public disclosure tort55
suggests that the major interest protected by information-control
is avoidance of the psychic and emotional damage caused by the
very fact of public disclosure:
What is really at issue when, for instance, a magazine
gives an account of the emotional crisis that a man faced
52 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. 213 (footnote omitted).
See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, supra note 3, at 970-7 1.
5 See id. 979, 1001-03.
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in leaving his wife and children, is not merely the dis-
tress the individual suffers as a result of the reawaken-
ing of his agony, but the debasement of his sense of
himself as a person that results because his life has be-
come a public spectacle against his will. There is an-
guish and mortification, a blow to human dignity, in
having the world intrude as an unwanted witness to
private tragedy. The wrong is to be found in the fact
that a private life has been transformed into a public
spectacle.
56
This interest relies on the concept that one element of indi-
viduality and personality is control of information about oneself,
and that loss of that element, without reference to the effect the
disclosure has on one's relations or on the public, can be dam-
aging.
57
Like an assault on the individual by the words of the dis-
closure, the disclosure itself inflicts emotional injury.5 8 There
can be great damage when an individual's beliefs59 or facts about
his distant past,60 shared with only a few intimates, are made
public against his will. 6I The information whose release would
cause the gravest injury is that which an individual has kept
secret from everyone; 62 as the circle of those to whom the in-
formation has already been released widens, however, the im-
pact of public disclosure upon the individual decreases, since he
has to an increasing extent already exposed his individuality.
Beyond the interest in maintaining control over the release
of personal information, another interest appears to have been
identified as included within "the right to live as one will," 63 or
"the right of the individual to be self-determining, to decide for
himself where he shall go and who he shall be . . ,"64 This is
the additional interest in avoiding the interference with one's
56 Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution, supra note 4, at 619. Cf. Nader v.
General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 565-66, 255 N.E.2d 765, 768, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647,
651-52 (1970); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, supra note 3, at 979.
57 Cf. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, supra note 3, at 980-8 1; War-
ren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 197-98. But see Prosser, supra note 2, at 398.
58 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 412-15 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
59 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
60 E.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971); cf. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 485 n.18 (1968).
", See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967).
62 See Fried, supra note 60, at 485.
63 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 196, 50 S.E.68, 70 (1905).
14 Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution, supra note 4, at 620.
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personal relationships that a public disclosure can cause. These
relationships range from the relatively distant ones between an
employer and his employee, or between a hacker and his once-
a-month golfing partner, to the most intimate kind, as between
an individual and his spouse, children, or parents. In all of these
relationships the individual retains an interest in deciding what
to reveal about himself. Interference with that interest can de-
stroy the relationship, either by providing information far more
intimate than the closeness of the relationship warrants, 65 or by
providing information that causes the other party to change or
terminate the relationship.6 6
If as information becomes more private an individual dis-
closes it to fewer of those with whom he has relationships, then
the more intimate the information publicly disclosed against an
individual's will, the more relationships the revelation will affect.
Further, if certain information is so private that an individual
does not share it with even some of his family and closest
friends, disclosure of that information can interfere with his
most important relationships.
In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association,67 for example, the
defendant's public disclosure of the plaintiff's long-past crime
severely disrupted Briscoe's relationship with his eleven-year-old
daughter; she had not previously known of her father's criminal
past.68 Similarly, it is not difficult to accept the allegation that the
public disclosure of a man's homosexuality caused his thereto-
fore uninformed brothers and sisters to shun him.69 On the
other hand, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 7 the detailed cir-
cumstances of the rape of the plaintiff's daughter were known to
many of plaintiff's friends and acquaintances and other mem-
bers of the public long before the press disclosed the victim's
11 [E]ven between friends the restraints of privacy apply; since friendship im-
plies a voluntary relinquishment of private information, one will not wish to
know what his friend or lover has not chosen to share with him. The rupture
of this balance by a third party . . . thrusting information concerning one
friend upon another might well destroy the limited degree of intimacy the two
have achieved.
Fried, supra note 60, at 485 (emphasis in original).
66 See A. WESTIN, supra note 61, at 38-39; cf. Fried, supra note 60, at 483.
67 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971). See text accompanying
notes 45-47 supra.
65 Id. at 533, 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
69 Such was the allegation of Oliver W. Sipple, the ex-Marine credited with thwart-
ing Sara Jane Moore's attempt on the life of President Ford, in his $15 million
invasion-of-privacy suit against the press. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1975, at 20, col. 1.
70 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
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name.7 1 Consequently, the defendants' disclosure could not con-
tribute significantly to the disruption of plaintiff's personal rela-
tionships. In addition, the disclosure interfered only minimally
with the plaintiff's interest in preserving his dignity by maintain-
ing personal control over the release of such private informa-
tion; he had already suffered the loss of control of this informa-
tion before the broadcast identifying his daughter. Although the
disclosure here thus had no significant effect on either of the
first two of plaintiff's three privacy interests, it did interfere with
his third interest, that in not having his reputation 72 tarnished
without his consent.
73
Any public disclosure will affect an individual's reputation
interest, because it will affect the public's perception of him.
Current constitutional and state law doctrines, however, prob-
ably do not allow an individual to recover for damage done by a
truthful statement to his reputation alone.7 4 It is, however, only
in a case like Cox, where the reputation interest was the only one
affected, that recovery should be barred because of the truth of
the disclosure. In many disclosure cases the first two identified
privacy interests-the interest in maintaining control over the
71 Appendix at 30-31, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (af-
fidavit of Martin Cohn). In fact, even before the press' disclosure, the details of the
incident had become so widely known, and the resulting harassment of his family so
great, that the plaintiff was forced to take his children out of school and send them and
his wife to another town. Id.
72 It should be noted that Professors Bloustein and Prosser disagree on the inclu-
sion of reputation as an interest affected by a public disclosure. Bloustein does not
include it; Prosser does. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, supra note 3, at
978; Prosser, supra note 2, at 398. This Comment takes the position that the reputation
interest is indeed affected by truthful public disclosures; nevertheless, an individual
probably cannot recover for the damage done to his reputation by a truthful disclosure.
See notes 74-75 infra & accompanying text.
7' The public disclosure tort protects an individual's interest not only in how the
public perceives him, but also, if he was an obscure person before the disclosure, in
whether there will be any public perception of him at all. See Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity, supra note 3, at 979; but cf. note 72 supra.
74 Truth is a constitutionally required defense to a defamation action by a public
official. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1975). Furthermore,
state law generally provides that truth is an absolute defense to a defamation action by
any person. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 116, at 797. The Court in Cox did not
resolve the question whether a private individual could constitutionally be allowed to
recover for damage to his reputation caused by truthful statements, 420 U.S. at 490-91,
but at least where the plaintiff may still recover for damage to his other privacy in-
terests, it would seem that truth precludes recovery for damage to the reputation in-
terest. See generally Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 966 (1976); W. PROSSER, supra
note 5, § 116, at 798; Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a
Defense in. Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 825 (1964). Cf. Nimmer, supra note 4, at
964-65 (suggesting that changing the label of an action from "defamation" to "privacy"
should not change the result).
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release of personal information and the interest in avoiding
the disruptive effect of public disclosure on one's personal
relationships-will also be affected, and the court can grant re-
lief for damage to those interests.7 5 Therefore, only the two
privacy interests other than reputation should be weighed
against the need for protection of the press.
What disclosures that affect the two crucial interests are
damaging enough to justify recovery? Disclosures of other than
intimate information generally do not have a substantial effect
on these interests. The facts of Cason v. Baskin76 illustrate this
point. Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, in an autobiographical book
about her experiences in rural Florida, accurately-and in great
detail-portrayed a woman from the area as superficially eccen-
tric, brusque, and prone to profanity, though actually efficient,
kind, and loving.77 The woman sued the author for invasion of
privacy. Because the woman had been portrayed to the public
and thus her right to control information about herself had been
violated, the Supreme Court of Florida held in her favor; be-
cause she demonstrated no injury, however, the court awarded
only nominal damages. 78 A more useful analysis would have
looked to the effect of the disclosure on the plaintiff's three
privacy interests. First, there was some interest in reputation
involved: The plaintiff's characteristics and probably her exis-
tence were disclosed to most of the world only by the book. In
ascribing masculine characteristics to her,79 the portrayal might
even have provided grounds for a defamation action, but the
uncontested accuracy of the description would have precluded
recovery."s Second, because the report of the case mentions no
characteristics described in the book that could not have been
,5 In Cox, Justice Powell recognized that while truth is a constitutionally required
defense to a suit by a private person for damage to reputation, a different standard,
involving a different analysis of the role of truth, could be applied to the protection of
privacy interests "that are distinct from those protected by defamation actions." 420
U.S. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring). The majority's apparent failure to recognize the
distinction between reputation and other privacy interests led to the statement in the
Court's opinion that truth is not necessarily a constitutionally required defense to ac-
tions for defamation of private individuals. Id. at 490. As Justice Powell pointed out, the
negligent falsehood standard for liability in Gertz is meaningless if truth is not a de-
fense. Id. at 499.
,1 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945), second appeal, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635
(1947).
" 155 Fla. at 202-07, 20 So. 2d at 245-47.
, 159 Fla. at 40, 30 So. 2d at 640.
,9 155 Fla. at 202-03, 20 So. 2d at 245.
go See note 74 supra & accompanying text.
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observed by any local resident,8' there were no disclosures that
could interfere with the plaintiff's close personal relationships.
Finally, the disclosures did affect the plaintiff's interest in defin-
ing her individuality by controlling the release of information
about herself, but the interference with the interest was inconse-
quential: As all the characteristics portrayed could be seen by an
interested public observer, the facts were hardly private.8 2
By contrast, Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association83 involved
substantial interference with the two paramount privacy in-
terests. The disclosure of long-past criminality-information
which plaintiff did not share beyond a narrow circle-could seri-
ously affect the individuality interest because of the impact on
the plaintiff of the public release of closely guarded facts.
Further, disclosure of such intimate information could disrupt
even the closest relationships, such as that between plaintiff and
his daughter.
To this point only privacy interests affected by public dis-
closure, not protected rights, have been identified. At the ex-
treme, the identified interests could support a general interest
against all public disclosures, but an individual's right clearly
does not extend so far.84 In fact, the damage to the interests
becomes substantial, making a strong case for a right against
public disclosure, only for information that an individual keeps
81 155 Fla. at 202-07, 20 So. 2d at 245-47.
82 See id. The plaintiff's real motives in this suit might be inferred from her claim
for a share of the profits the defendant received from the book, on the theory that the
appropriation of the plaintiff's biographical sketch enriched the defendant unjustly.
The court held that this latter claim, as distinguished from the invasion of privacy
claim, stated no cause of action. Id. at 220-21, 20 So. 2d at 254.
83 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971). See text accompanying
notes 45-47, 67-68 supra.
84 In concrete situations and actual societies, control over information
about oneself, like control over one's bodily security or property, can only be
relative and qualified. As is true for property or bodily security, the control
over privacy must be limited by the rights of others. And as in the cases of
property and bodily security, so too with privacy the more one ventures into
the outside, the more one pursues one's other interest with the aid of, in com-
petition with, or even in the presence of others, the more one must risk inva-
sions of privacy. Moreover, as with property and personal security, it is the
business of legal and social institutions to define and protect the right of pri-
vacy which emerges intact from the hurly-burly of social interactions .... The
delineation of standards must be left to a political and social process the results
of which will accord with justice if two conditions are met: (1) the process itself
is just, that is the interests of all are fairly represented; and (2) the outcome of
the process protects basic dignity and provides moral capital for personal rela-
tions in the form of absolute title to at least some information about oneself.
Fried, supra note 60, at 486-87. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EX-
PRESSION 556 (1970).
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within a small circle of intimates. Even where the damage is
substantial, however, protection of the privacy interests must
take account of the countervailing interest in freedom of the
press. Before suggesting the elements of a test that gives ade-
quate protection to both sides, this Comment will examine the
current state of constitutional protection of the press.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE PRESS IN
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACTIONS
A. Swallowing the Public Disclosure Tort
Following the state law approach to protecting the press in
public disclosure actions,8 5 the Supreme Court held in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 86 that the disclosure of information
appearing in public records is constitutionally protected. TIhe
Court based its decision on the press' right to report some mat-
ters of public interest, such as crimes, prosecutions, and judicial
proceedings, which are "without question events of legitimate
concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsi-
bility of the press to report the operations of government.
87
Time, Inc. v. Hill,8 the Supreme Court's first foray into the
invasion of privacy field, had suggested a broader "public in-
terest" privilege. Three escaped convicts held the Hill family
hostage in their home for nineteen hours. After the family was
released unharmed, plaintiff stressed in statements to newsmen
that there had been no violence and that no members of the
family had been molested. Three years later a play about a fam-
ily held hostage by escaped convicts opened on Broadway. In the
play, "[T]he father and son are beaten and the daughter sub-
jected to a verbal sexual insult."89 The defendant published a
magazine article describing the play as a dramatization of the
incident involving the Hill family; the article included pictures of
"re-enacted" scenes of violence taken from the play, photo-
graphed using members of the cast in the Hills' former home.91'
Hill brought suit for invasion of privacy in New York, a state
that allowed recovery for public disclosure of newsworthy items
about an individual if the items were false.91 The Supreme Court
85 See text accompanying notes 32-48 supra.
86 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
8 7 Id. at 492.
88 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
8 9 d. at 378.
901d. at 377-78.
91 The New York Court of Appeals early rejected Warren and Brandeis' argument,
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held that where the publication was newsworthy, mere falsity was
not sufficient to strip it of first amendment protection: Time was
liable only if it published the article with knowledge of its falsity
or in reckless disregard of the truth. 2 Although turning in part
on peculiarities of New York law,93 this holding, when coupled
with the Court's earlier recognition of a broad privilege protect-
ing truthful statements of public interest,94 implied that all
truthful disclosures of matters of public interest are constitution-
ally protected. Statements that are not of public interest, how-
ever, are not protected by this privilege, and are actionable if
they fall within otherwise permissible95 state law proscriptions.96
The public interest test used by the Court in Time, Inc. v.
Hill was a broad one. The New York courts found that the
article had sensational and promotional appeal and could not be
"characterized as a mere dissemination of news, nor even an
effort to supply legitimate newsworthy information in which the
public had, or might have a proper interest."97 The Supreme
Court, however, found the subject matter of the article to be of
public interest, using a more inclusive standard that protected
disclosures concerning " 'all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their period,' ",98 interpreted broadly to
include "entertaining" as well as "informing."99
holding in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N:E. 442 (1902),
that no common law right to privacy existed. Roberson was an appropriation case in
which a young woman's picture was being used without her permission on boxes of
flour with the slogan "The Flour of the Family." In response, the state legislature
passed a statute giving a cause of action for appropriation for commercial purposes.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948) (originally enacted as ch. 132, [1903]
N.Y. Laws 308). The state courts, in turn, construed that statute well beyond its terms
to allow recovery for fictionalized public disclosure of newsworthy facts. See Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879
(1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 239, on remand, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840,
286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
9 385 U.S. at 387-88.
9' See id. at 391-92.
91 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S.
Ct. 958, 966 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 498 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring).
95 Truth appears to be an absolute defense in an action for injury to reputation
only. See notes 74-75 supra & accompanying text.
9' See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 383 n.7; T. EMERsoN, supra note 84, at
552-54; cf. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution, supra note 4, at 622.
97 Hill v. Hayes, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 489, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290 (1963), affd, 15
N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), rev'd sub nom. Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
98 385 U.S. at 388 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
99 Id.
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B. The Decline of Time, Inc. v. Hill
The public interest standard of Time, Inc. v. Hill leaves the
courts with the two undesirable alternatives of allowing the press
to define matters of public interest as whatever the media choose
to cover, thus completely swallowing"' the public disclosure
tort,""a or of embarking on the dangerous task of defining what
matters are of "legitimate" public interest.1 °2 The first alternative
would eliminate liability for disclosure of even the most intimate
information, regardless of the interference with privacy in-
terests; the second would place the courts in a role that has been
rejected as "surely in conflict with the whole idea of the First
Amendment."'' a 3 A test of first amendment protection based on
what the public may legitimately be informed of provides a most
tempting opportunity for censorship by judges and juries. I 4 Not
only is the test uncertain, but also there is the added hazard that
in deciding whether content is legitimately public, judges and
(especially) juries are unlikely to remain neutral. 1 5
Both deeper analysis of the privacy interests at stake and
later case law, however, indicate that this public interest standard
may not be applicable today in public disclosure actions. Because
state law required that recovery be based on falsity, the Court in
Time, Inc. v. Hill could only take account of the plaintiff's interest
in reputation. Hill's other privacy interests, However, may well
have been affected also: his individuality interest in preventing
disclosure of at least partially private information, and his in-
terest in not having a three-year-old incident disclosed to new
and otherwise uninformed friends. 
1 0
6
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.10 7 the Supreme Court held that
100 See Kalven, supra note 1, at 336.
101 See Prosser, supra note 2, at 412; cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
357 n.6 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
102 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
103 T. EMERSON, supra note 84, at 554. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 346 (1974). But see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J 1, 26-28 (1971).
104 Cf. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275-77 (1971).
105 The test, therefore, "holds a real danger of becoming an instrument for the
suppression of those 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,' ...
which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are
to prevail." Id. at 277 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)). Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971). But see Bloustein, The First
Amendment and Privacy, supra note 4, at 56-63.
106 See T. EMERSON, supra note 84, at 555; Bloustein, The First Amendment and
Privacy, supra note 4, at 92-93; Nimmer, supra note 4, at 958.
1"7 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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a plaintiff who was not a public official or public figure could
recover actual damages for publication of a defamatory false-
hood even though publication was only negligent and without
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. 08 This
holding was especially significant in its deviation from the trend
of earlier cases, 10 9 which had determined the level of constitu-
tional protection of the press by the degree of public interest
present.110 Gertz, by contrast, signaled the Court's new awareness
that the importance of the individual interest being protected by
state law-in this case a libel law-should be balanced against the
interest of the press in immunity from liability:
[W]e believe that [the proper approach is] an accom-
modation between [the interest of the press] and the
limited state interest present in the context of libel ac-
tions brought by private persons. ... [W]e conclude that
the state interest in compensating injury to the reputa-
tion of private individuals requires that a different rule
should obtain with respect to them."'
The Court went on to explain why a state has a greater interest
in protecting the reputation of a private person than that of a
public official or public figure. Because private persons have less
access to the media to "counteract false statements," the Court
said, they "are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater."' 1 2 Fur-
thermore, by not seeking public office or notoriety, the private
individual
has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection
of his own good name, and consequently he has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury in-
flicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private indi-
viduals are not only more vulnerable to injury than pub-
lic officials and public figures; they are also more
deserving of recovery. 113
108 Id. at 347-49.
' See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
""See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 965-66 (1976).
"' 418 U.S. at 343. See Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten
Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 793-94
(1975).
112 418 U.S. at 344.
"
3 Id. at 345. The Court recently indicated that its definition of "public figure" is
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Thus, after Gertz, it appears that reliance on public interest
as the sole test of constitutional protection of the press in defa-
mation actions 1 4 has been abandoned in favor of a test that
considers the strength of the individual's interest in preserving
his reputation. Although the Supreme Court has not yet applied
this new approach in a privacy case, the rationale of the new test
applies to public disclosures as well as to defamation. Gertz
extended more protection in defamation actions to private
persons than to public officials or figures to accommodate the
greater state interest in compensating these "deserving plain-
tiffs. 11 5 Where private plaintiffs are involved, the state interest
was held to be great enough to allow somewhat less protection
for the press 1 6 because of the strength of any person's interest
in preserving his reputation, because a private person has no
access to the media to counteract the falsehood, and because a
private person has not voluntarily exposed his reputation to pub-
lic scrutiny."
7
In public disclosure actions, the argument is even stronger
for using a test that focuses on the individual interests at stake,
rather than the broad public interest test of Time, Inc. v. Hill. Not
only is the reputation of the public disclosure plaintiff often
affected, but his other two privacy interests are often affected as
well. 1 8 Furthermore, even if he were to gain access to the media,
such a "self-help" remedy 1 9 would be ineffective: Where the
disclosure is true, further exposure can only make matters worse.
quite restrictive, holding that a well-known socialite did not meet the test. Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 965 (1976).
114 Gertz indicates that such a test would bar most recoveries in defamation actions.
See 418 U.S. at 342. After Gertz it is also open to question whether Time, Inc. v. Hill
remains applicable even to its own facts; under the Gertz test Hill would have been a
private figure. See Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1974); N.
DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE, 1 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 526-27 (4th ed. law school 1976).
'1 418 U.S. at 342-43.
116 After Gertz protection afforded the press in defamation cases breaks down into
three categories: (1) In a suit for defamation of a public official, media liability must be
based on publication with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). (2) The same standard applies to
defamation of a public figure. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). (3)
As long as they do not impose liability without fault, the states may define for them-
selves the appropriate standard of liability for actual damages for a publisher of a de-
famatory falsehood that injures a private individual and whose substance makes sub-
stantial danger to reputation apparent. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
347-48 (1974).
117 418 U.S. at 344-45.
118 See text accompanying notes 49-84, 106 supra.
'19 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
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Finally, even if a person engages in such activities as to "invite
attention and comment,' 20 thus constructively opening his
reputation to attack, he cannot be presumed to be voluntarily
relinquishing his interests in maintaining his personal relation-
ships intact and preserving his dignity by retaining control over
the release of private information about himself.
The current state of constitutional protection for false, de-
famatory speech, and, by analogy, for speech publicizing truth-
ful, private facts about individuals, therefore requires consid-
eration of the importance of the precise individual interests in
reputation and privacy that are at stake. This new approach is a
departure from the Time, Inc. v. Hill standard, which determined
constitutional protection of the media by a broad public interest
test, regardless of the importance of the privacy interests
involved. 12' The cases indicate, however, that the public interest
test is by no means entirely obsolete. Gertz, even while disclaim-
ing a test based on legitimacy of public interest, 22 implied that
some conception of public interest figures into the distinction
between private persons and public figures.
23
In its recent decision in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,'24 the Court
clearly relied on its finding of a lack of legitimate public interest
in holding that the plaintiff was a private person rather than a
public figure. The erstwhile wife of Russell Firestone, scion of
the wealthy industrial family, sued Time for reporting that Fire-
stone had been granted a divorce for his wifq's "extreme cruelty
and adultery." In spite of the national news coverage of the
trial, 125 the press conferences on the "cause c~l~bre' ' 26 given by
120 Id. at 345.
121 See text accompanying notes 86-99 supra.
122 318 U.S. at 346. Indeed, the Court went so far as to find "no constitutional
value" in false disclosures. Id. at 340. That conclusion can mean either that first
amendment principles simply do not apply to such disclosures or that the first amend-
ment does not prohibit the enforcement of the privacy interest over the public interest
in disclosure. The first reading would make false disclosure cases irrelevant to cases
involving disclosure of true facts; true disclosures are clearly within the ambit of the
first amendment. But the latter reading is more consistent with the rest of Gertz: The
Court's emphasis on the need for a "strong" derivative state interest in protecting an
individual's reputation, id. at 348, the restriction of the state interest to compensation
for actual harm, id. at 349, and the need for some level of press culpability, id. at
347-48, would indicate that falsity, without more, does not strip a disclosure of first
amendment protection. If that is so, falsity's role in the defamation calculus is to reduce
the public interest in the disclosure. See N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, and B. NEUBORNE, supra
note 114, at 341-43, 524.
123 See id. at 343-45.
124 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
12- Id. at 973 n.8 (Powell, J., concurring).
12r Id. at 965.
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the plaintiff, 12 7 and the fact that her "appearances in the printed
press were evidently frequent enough to warrant her subscribing
to a press clipping service,"'128 the Court did not find her a
public figure within the meaning of Gertz.' 29 Referring to Gertz'
recognition that an individual may "voluntarily [inject] himself
or [be] drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
* . . [become] a public figure,"1 30 the Firestone Court refused to
characterize the divorce as a "public controversy" merely because
the public was interested.' 3 ' As Justice Marshall pointed out,
however, the plaintiff both had access to the media and easily
could be considered to have "invite[d] attention and
comment"' 32-the two factors Gertz found necessary for a find-
ing that one was a public figure.
The result in Firestone can best be explained by the
hypothesis that the majority simply did not think the public in-
terest at stake was one justifying a higher standard of protection
for the press.' 3 3 Both the United States 134 and Florida
3 5 su-
preme courts distinguished public controversies that legitimated
a higher standard for defamation from those undeserving of the
increased first amendment protection. Where such a distinction
results in a concomitant finding of a "public figure," it may be
safely assumed that the protection of the first amendment
thereby depends on the existence of a legitimate public interest.
These developments in the Supreme Court's approach to
defamation suggest that the broad public interest test of Time,
Inc. v. Hill is no longer viable in public disclosure cases. Rather,
to be congruent with current constitutional doctrine, a test for
the permissibility of recovery in public disclosure cases must in-
corporate two stages. First, the precise individual interest being
protected by the state must be important enough to survive ini-
tial scrutiny by a court. Second, even where this interest rises to
the threshold level of legitimacy, there must be a further inquiry
to determine whether there is a legitimate public interest which
requires protection for the press.
2 I Id. at 981-82 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112 1 d. at 980 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1
2
9 Id. at 965. See text accompanying notes 107-13 supra.
130 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
131 96 S. Ct. at 965.
132 Id. at 981 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
1
3 3 
Id.
134 Id. at 965.
'
35 Id. at 981-82 n.1 (Marshall J., dissenting).
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V. PROTECTION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AS A
RIGHT SUPERSEDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Rationale for the Right
State legislation protecting privacy interests against media
intrusion clearly tends "'to stifle, penalize, or curb the exercise
of First Amendment rights' "136 and as such must reflect a "com-
pelling state interest."1 37 If the state law narrowly circumscribes
both the privacy interests and the infringement on freedom of
the press, however, the requirements of the first amendment will
be satisfied.'
38
To this end, simply making actionable the disclosure of mat-
ters outside some definition of the "public interest" is un-
satisfactory.1 39 Instead, it is proposed here that the states may
protect against only the narrow class of public disclosures reveal-
ing particularly intimate details1 4" Analogies to cases protecting
privacy interests against the press' news-gathering rights and
governmental disclosure support this proposal.
1. Privacy and the Press' Right to Gather News
Although the press apparently has a first amendment right
to gather news,14' an individual's right to privacy gives a state a
strong enough interest to prohibit the press from gathering news
by entering a person's home without permission, 142 by using
electronic listening devices, 143 or by conducting surveillance of
136 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Gremil-
lion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961)).
137 1d. at 438; accord Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972); DeGregory v.
Attorney General, 383 U.S. 829 (1966).
138 Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963). The states have un-
enumerated plenary police powers except in areas where they are restricted by the
Constitution, including the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). The question thus becomes whether and at what
point the state interest is strong enough to supersede the press' first amendment
rights. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 973 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1'3 9 See text accompanying notes 85-105 supra.
140 Harm emanating from the release of less intimate information simply must be
expected by members of society, and cannot realistically be considered actionable. See
text accompanying notes 76-84 supra.
141 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Comment, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1975). But
cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
142 See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 449 F.2d
245 (9th Cir. 1971).
143 Cf. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969).
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an individual with such harassing, persistent, and intrusive
methods that she fears for her physical safety. 144 It may well be
that the press' right to print what it knows is more firmly an-
chored within the limits of first amendment protection than is
the news-gathering right.145 Nonetheless, even if the actual dis-
semination of news is affected, a strong enough state interest can
prevail.1 46 A similar regulation of public disclosures would im-
pose a more direct burden on the first amendment rights than
would a restriction on news gathering. But if the state can show
that the interference caused by certain disclosures is great
enough, and if the infringement of first amendment rights is
narrowly confined, the privacy interest should outweight the
press' right to make the disclosure. 147
2. Privacy and Government Disclosure
Recent cases indicate that the same privacy interests pro-
tected by the states through the public disclosure tort have been
given constitutional recognition in protecting individuals against
government disclosure. In Doe v. McMillan, 48 a congressional
committee investigating disciplinary problems in District of Co-
lumbia schools ordered the publication of its report, which
included disclosures of absenteeism, failing grades, and disci-
plinary problems of named students. Parents of the schoolchil-
dren filed suit to enjoin the public distribution, alleging "that
such publication had caused and would cause grave damage to
the children's mental and physical health and to their reputa-
tions, good names, and future careers."'
1 49
The Supreme Court held that, although members of the
committee and their aides were protected by the speech or
debate clause, 5 " other government functionaries, including
Government Printing Office officials, could be enjoined from
allowing further public distribution, on the ground that such
distribution went "beyond the apparent needs of the 'due
function of the [legislative] process.' "15
144 Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 223-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified, 487 F.2d
986 (2d Cir. 1973).
145 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 691 (1972).
146 Id. at 693-95, 700.
147 See T. EMERSON, supra note 84, at 549.
148 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
149 Id. at 309.
"I "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [senators and representatives] shall
not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
151 412 U.S. at 317 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 516 (1972)).
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More illuminating, however, was Justice Douglas' concur-
rence, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. It suggested
that Congress could not be prohibited from distributing the re-
port publicly unless publication "infringes upon the constitu-
tional rights of petitioners and therefore is subject to scrutiny by
the federal courts."' 52 The concurring Justices concluded that
the students' constitutional rights were violated by such disclo-
sures "for the sake of exposure"' 53 which "exceeded the 'sphere
of legitimate legislative activity.' ",154 Thus, the petitioners' in-
terest in keeping certain personal information private was con-
sidered to be of constitutional dimensions, at least where
direct infringement by the government was present.
On similar constitutional grounds courts have protected
against government disclosure of arrest records,' 55 a policeman's
personnel file,1 56 and records regarding health and medical
treatment.'5 7 On the other hand, government disclosure of
motor vehicle registrations'5 8 or teachers' salaries159 has been
permitted on the theory that such information was not private
enough to warrant protection against disclosure.
Of course, the scope of the state-protected right enforceable
against the press is not necessarily the same as that of the con-
stitutional right protecting against government disclosure. First,
the government's interest in disclosure in a given case may be
weaker than the press', for only the latter is protected by the
first amendment. 60 Second, although government disclosure af-
152 Id. at 328 (Douglas, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 330 (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957)); cf. id. at
316 (majority opinion).
154 Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
376 (1951)).
155 See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), modified sub nom.
Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487
P.2d 211 (1971). But see Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
156 See People v. Norman, 76 Misc. 2d 644, 350 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
157 Cf., e.g., Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1973).
158 Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
159 Mans v. Lebanon School Bd., 112 N.H. 160, 290 A.2d 866 (1972).
160 Although the government might be prohibited from making certain disclosures
without reference to the information's intimacy, but merely on the grounds that the
disclosure is not a legitimate governmental function, compare Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155
(1976) with Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 317, it is more likely that the intimacy of the
information disclosed does play a role in a judicial decision to prohibit disclosure. This is
so because if no privacy interests were infringed by the disclosure there would be no
grounds for judicial scrutiny of the government's interest. Doe v. McMillan, supra at
328 (Douglas, J., concurring). Furthermore, the government would seem to have less of
a legitimate function in selling lists of motor vehicle registrants to the highest bidder for
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fects the interests protected by the public disclosure tort, it can
also affect other individual interests, such as the ability to engage
freely in chosen activities. 161 But the right against government
disclosures can reach constitutional dimensions where the pri-
vacy interests protected by the public disclosure tort are impli-
cated.
The federal system and the fourteenth amendment state
action doctrine leave to the states the primary responsibility for
protecting privacy interests from private infringement. 62 Both
the government disclosure and the newsgathering cases strongly
indicate that the first amendment does not prevent the states
from regulating disclosures by private persons, where particu-
larly private information is involved and privacy interests are
seriously infringed.
B. The Scope of the Right Enforceable
Against the Press
This Comment has suggested that public disclosure of in-
formation that an individual releases to only the narrowest
circle of intimates will be the most damaging to his privacy
interests, 63 and that the dissemination of information already
released beyond a very narrow circle will result in little dam-
age.
1 64
This analysis must be applied with some care, for a seem-
ingly innocuous disclosure can unexpectedly result in serious
interference with a person's privacy interests. For instance, a
newspaper's "innocent" restaurant review, accompanied by a
photograph showing a couple pleasurably dining, might in fact
reveal a married person out with his or her illicit lover. Such a
disclosure could very well result in serious damage to the indi-
viduals' privacy interests. Holding the press liable for such dis-
closures, however, would have a serious chilling effect on report-
ing, since virtually any article or feature could, by chance,
purposes of merchandise solicitation than in disclosing arrest records to other govern-
mental agencies. Yet the latter has been prohibited-at least where the privacy interest
was seen to outweigh the governmental, Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C.
1971), modified sub nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974)-and the
former _permitted, Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
161 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
162 See Katz v. United States, 385 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
163 See text accompanying notes 55-84 supra.
164 See text accompanying notes 62, 71, 76-82 supra.
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infringe on an individual's privacy interests. 165 The preferred
approach would grant the press "breathing space" by permitting
relief only for disclosures of the kind of information that the
press reasonably should know an individual ordinarily reveals to
his most intimate relations alone.
166
Allowing an action in tort for only these kinds of disclosures
would still protect against the vast majority of genuinely damag-
ing public disclosures. First, the cases and authorities are in sub-
stantial agreement as to which disclosures seriously infringe
on the individuality interest by revealing "the inner core of
personality.' 67 The area where public disclosures are genuinely
damaging is marked by the details of one's sexual activities,
68
health, 169 distant past, 170 and little else.
Second, society defines by convention some of the areas con-
sidered most private; there is a societal consensus that publica-
don of a photograph of a person in the nude will seriously affect
privacy interests whereas disclosures of a person's eating habits
will not.' 7 ' The existence of such a consensus as to what matters
are considered to be private per se enables the press to recognize
these areas of symbolic privacy and gives it adequate notice not
to expose these matters to public view.
172
Disclosure of one's criminal past, for example, or of the
scholastic and disciplinary problems of one's childhood, are the
kinds of disclosures that one would reasonably expect to be
shared only with a small circle of intimates; public disclosures of
such information can result in substantial damage to one's in-
dividuality and personal relationships. 173 On the other hand,
165 To hold the press liable in such cases would destroy the "breathing space" man-
dated by the first amendment. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72
(1964).
166 See generally id. at 278-80. The press, of course, has the additional protection of
the Supreme Court's "public interest" doctrine. See text accompanying notes 180-99 infra.
167 T. EMERSON, supra note 84, at 556.
16 See Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); A. WESTIN,
supra note 61, at 36.
16See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); cf. Fried, supra
note 60, at 488.
170 See cases cited note 21 supra.
1'71 See Fried, supra note 60, at 477-88.
17' A standard requiring the press to exercise reasonable care in recognizing the
kinds of information which an individual generally wishes to keep most private is no
more inhibiting than a standard of liability for negligent falsehoods, which is a constitu-
tionally permissible standard in defamation actions. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345-50 (1974).
17-&See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971); cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
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where information is readily available to friends, acquaintances,
and even casual passers-by, an individual cannot have a reason-
able expectation of privacy, and incremental exposure to a wider
public should not be actionable. When, for example, a man and
woman embrace in full view of complete strangers, the press can-
not reasonably expect that they want to keep their actions pri-
vate.1 74 Even if an individual becomes an unwilling actor in pub-
lic events, as when a husband walking with his wife is attacked,
and the wife's photograph is taken at the scene and published,
the random public exposure at the time of the attack makes the
further public disclosure relatively inconsequential.
175
The standard, thus, is generic; liability does not depend on
the particular fact situation nor the harm shown in any given
case, but on whether the type of information disclosed could be
expected to infringe on core privacy interests. The press is
thereby afforded far more protection than it would receive
under a test examining the "reasonableness" of the disclosure on
a given set of facts. Applied to Time, Inc. v. Hill,' 76 the latter test
might well have permitted recovery against the magazine, since
some privacy interests might in fact have been damaged; 77 the
press would risk a lawsuit with every disclosure of the name of a
crime victim. But under the proposed standard, the Hills' al-
leged injury would be outside the scope of constitutionally per-
missible state protection. 78
174 See Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953).
175 See Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929). See also Blou-
stein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution, supra note 4, at 628:
Contemporaneous reports of notorious incidents of personal life would
seem less subject to restriction than reports of incidents long past because, in
many instances, the contemporaneous publication seems hardly capable of
further demeaning the individual. The very happening of some events-for
example, a divorce involving a charge of adultery-i5 itself so destructive of the
sense of privacy and dignity of the individual that the contemporaneous publica-
tion is simply not taken to be further demeaning of privacy, however great its
tendency to cause further embarrassment. It can also be argued under some
circumstances that an incident is so notorious that contemporaneous publication
can hardly cause a further impairment of privacy.
In Neff v. Time, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 2373 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1976), Sports Illustrated
published a photograph of a football fan with the zipper of his trousers open. Relying on
the fact that the fan was one of a group that had encouraged and posed for the photo-
grapher, the court held that the disclosure was "not a matter concerning a private fact."
Id. at 2374.
16 385 U.S. 374 (1967). See text ccompanying notes 88-99 supra.
77 See Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy, supra note 4, at 60-62, 93-94.
17' See T. EmERSON, supra note 84, at 556:
An individual caught up in a public event, even though no fault of his own,
cannot expect to keep it private, either at the time or later. The injury to his
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C. Public Interest or Public Figure Exceptions
In Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.179 a former child prodigy had
sought and found obscurity, although he had been a public fig-
ure twenty-five years earlier. He unsuccessfully brought suit
when a magazine disclosed his past. Because disclosures concern-
ing one's distant past fall within the narrow range of actionable
privacy invasions under the test suggested here, °80 the state
could enforce them against the first amendment rights of the
publisher who unearthed the facts of his youth.' 8' Although the
court in Sidis left open the question whether the "news worthi-
ness" of the disclosure would adequately defend the publisher
against the privacy action,' 82 even under the narrowly circum-
scribed privacy standard proposed by this Comment'83 a second
requirement under the first amendment would prevent recovery
by the public disclosure tort plaintiff where the otherwise ac-
tionable disclosure is of legitimate public interest.
The Supreme Court has indicated that disclosures are con-
stitutionally unprotected only if they "'are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.' ",184 Even where the state has a strong "social interest,"
if there is a public interest in the disclosure of the identity of
an individual, such a disclosure will be protected by the first
amendment.
85
feelings, like any other accident he meets with, is part of his life in society.
Prohibition on discussion of matters such as those depicted in the play or in
the magazine article is not compelled by either the psychological needs of the
individual or the social needs for independent citizens underlying the privacy
system.
179 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). See note 48 supra.
180 See text accompanying note 170 supra.
181 Cf. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (radio
dramatization of holdup and shooting over a year after commission held invasion of
victim's privacy).
Distinguishing between Sids and Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91
(1931), the latter involving disclosures of a respectable woman's past life as a prostitute
and murder defendant, Prosser suggests a "mores" test apparently differentiating be-
tween merely pathetic disclosures and morally offensive ones. W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
§ 117, at 812. In view of the societal consensus on the privacy to be accorded one's
distant past, however, both cases fall on the same side of the line; both present situa-
tions in which the state could constitutionally provide a remedy for the disclosure.
182 113 F.2d 806, 809.
83 See text accompanying note 166 supra.
184 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). For a discussion of what the Court
means by "unprotected" see note 122 supra.
185 See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); cf. Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
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Such a test would protect the press whenever the identifica-
tion of an individual in a public disclosure was in the public
interest. It would require, if the press is not to become the final
arbiter of public interest, that the courts determine which mat-
ters are "legitimately" of interest to the public. Granting the
courts such quasi-censorship over speech in general would be
most dangerous to first amendment values.' 8 6 But the proposed
standard would require this inquiry only when the disclosure is
in a very narrowly circumscribed area: where the information
disclosed is of the type that the press can reasonably expect an
individual to reveal only to his most intimate relations. The in-
quiry is thus less likely to endanger first amendment rights both
because of the importance of the state interest and because its
narrow operation will result in only a minimal "chilling effect!'
on the press.
187
186 See text accompanying notes 100-05 supra.
187 Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
But cf. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2215
(1976) (Brennan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting), in which a magazine article on body surfing
at a particularly dangerous California beach contained a photograph of the plaintiff to-
gether with personal information obtained in an interview with him. Suing for invasion
of privacy, the plaintiff alleged that although he granted the interviews, which both he
and the court conceded amounted to consent, id. at 1124, 1127, he later revoked his
consent by objecting to publication. Id. He specifically objected to "a series of anecdotes
about him that emphasize the psychological characteristics which presumably explain
the reckless disregard for his own safety which his surfing demonstrates." Id. at 1124.
Included were an incident in which the plaintiff extinguished a woman's cigarette in his
mouth in response to her request for an ashtray, and another in which he won a small
bet by burning a hole in a dollar bill that was resting on the back of his hand, in the
process burning two holes in his wrist. Id. at 1124 n.1.
On a certified interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), the court of
appeals vacated and remanded for reconsideration the district court's denial of the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 527 F.2d at 1131. On reconsideration,
however, if the facts disclosed were "private" at state law-that is, not actually disclosed
to the public before the article, see notes 33-34 and accompanying text, supra-the only
first amendment defense available to the defendant was newsworthiness defined as
"legitimate public interest." Id. at 1128-30. The court rejected the defendant's proposed
test of constitutional protection, which also focused solely on newsworthiness: whether
as a matter of law a disclosure "constitutes a clear abuse of the editor's constitutional
discretion to publish and discuss subjects and facts which in his judgment are matters
of public interest." Id. at 1130.
Under either test first amendment protection for any disclosure would depend sole-
ly on the inquiry whether the public had a legitimate interest in knowing-precisely the
approach which contains the greatest potential for abuse through judicial censorship of
the press. This Comment proposes an approach that first would examine whether the
interests protected under the label "privacy" are important enougl to limit first
amendment protection. In Virgil the cigarette incidents as described took place in the
presence of others and were plainly not the type of information an individual would
reasonably be expected to share with only his closest intimates. The dangerous question
of "legitimate public interest," therefore, need not have been reached.
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Current constitutional doctrine may make the press'
privilege in public disclosure cases turn on the public figure-
private person distinction, rather than on the presence or ab-
sence of public interest.188 Although the result of a defamation
action could hinge on which of these tests is used, in public dis-
closure cases the choice of tests will not affect the result. One
rationale of the public figure test is that the public figure
has greater access to the media than the private person and
can consequently counteract defamatory falsehoods by "more
speech."' 89 In public disclosure cases, by contrast, where the
damaging statements are true to begin with, "more speech" is of
no use. 190 The remaining rationale for use of the public figure
test is that the public figure is presumed to "consent" to disclo-
sure of private facts related to his public life. Thus, political
candidates become public figures for public disclosure purposes
for virtually all subjects. 191 Truthful public disclosure that a can-
didate was a former bootlegger' 92 or that a presidential candi-
date fathered an illegitimate child' 93 is constitutionally protected.
Similarly, although an individual convicted for hijacking a truck
a decade ago would ordinarily be protected against disclosure of
that fact, he could be held to "consent" to its disclosure, as re-
lated to his public life, if he were now manager of a truck freight
transfer depot.'
94
On the other hand, especially because an individual appar-
ently may become a public figure merely by engaging in one
isolated public activity, 95 a public figure for one purpose should
not lose his status as a private individual for all purposes. 96 A
1'8 See text accompanying notes 107-35 supra.
189 See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring), quoted in Nimmer, supra note 4, at 950.
190 See text accompanying note 119 supra; Nimmer, supra note 4, at 961. It is true
that reputation is one of the interests affected by true public disclosures; but, even
where it is the only interest affected, as in Cox, the damage to reputation cannot be
cured by further exposure in the media. Consequently, a public figure should recover
for a public disclosure whenever a private person should, unless the general "public
interest" exception dictates another result.
191 See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274-77 (1971).
19 2 See id. at 277.
M9 3 See Prosser, supra note 2, at 417 n.282.
194 Cf. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971).
19- "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own .. " Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 345 (1974). See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
196 Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). See generally Warren
& Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-16.
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previously obscure individual who grabs a would-be assassin's
arm and thus helps to prevent an assassination "consents" to
becoming a public figure for purposes of reports about the at-
tempted assassination. He does not lose his status as a private
individual, however, for other purposes. Thus, when the press
discloses that he-is a homosexual, he should not be barred from
recovery.
1 97
This concept of consent, however, is a legal fiction. 198 A
candidate with a criminal past does not consent to its disclosure;
he hopes it will not be discovered. The real justification for al-
lowing such disclosures is that the public has an overriding in-
terest in knowing those facts so that, for instance, voters may
have all relevant information about the candidate before they
vote for or against him. 99 Similarly, the hero in the assassination
attempt can recover, not because he did not consent to the dis-
closure of his homosexuality, but because the public, in learning
about the assassination attempt, had no legitimate interest in
learning about his homosexuality. If, on the other hand, he had
been dishonorably discharged from the Secret Service ten years
before, that fact could be of such public interest vis-a-vis his role
in the abortive assassination as to justify disclosure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing is an attempt to answer the question left
open by Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn; 0° namely, what is to be
the proper accommodation of an individual's right to privacy
and the press' freedom under the first amendment. It has been
suggested that the traditional state law approach to the public
disclosure tort is deficient: it does not adequately identify the
privacy interests that most require protection, and it uses an
overly broad "public interest" test as an absolute defense. That
approach is susceptible either to excessive license for the press,
or to dangerous censorship by the courts.
This Comment has argued that the danger of too broad a
privilege for the press can be avoided by using a court-defined
(rather than press-defined) "legitimate public interest" test.2 0 '
'17 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1975, at 20, col. 1.
198 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
199 Cf. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1971).
200 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
201 This Comment's major focus has been to suggest a two-step test for public dis-
closures which places analysis of the privacy interests affected and analysis of the public
interest at stake in separate stages, insulated one from another. Under this approach
FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
The danger of censorship by the courts can be mitigated in
accordance with first amendment requirements by implement-
ing, not an uncertain balancing test, but a more predictable two-
step approach. First, the range 'of actionable disclosures is
narrowed and objectified, thereby permitting the press to rea-
sonably ascertain which disclosures are within the generally un-
protected area, rather than forcing it to guess on subjective "pri-
vateness." Only after that threshold inquiry has determined that
the privacy interests at stake are within the narrowly defined set
of interests strong enough to permit some curtailment of first
amendment rights is the question of "legitimate public interest"
reached; the number of cases in which the courts will be called
on to determine public interest is thereby reduced. 202 Under this
suggested approach, important privacy interests can be pro-
tected, while at the same time the freedom of the press is cur-
tailed only enough to allow the necessary protection of privacy.
the two-step structure itself is intended to increase the protection of the press. How-
ever, some broad suggestions for the proper content of the public interest test, which
remains an important, though no longer the sole, element of first amendment protec-
tion, can be made. First, the "absolutist" approach, which allows the press to determine
public interest by what it chooses to publish, should be rejected as negating the whole
idea of the two-step concept and swallowing the tort. Another possibility is the "public
records" doctrine of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). That ap-
proach is acceptable as far as it goes, but it clearly does not cover many matters of real
public interest which have not happened to be reported in public records. Also, it is
unclear from the language of Cox whether the doctrine means that the actual source of
the information disclosed must be a public record, or only that it is sufficient if the
information is a matter of public record somewhere, regardless of the actual source. See
id. at 494-95. Third, there is the theory that the first amendment protects speech that
provides the audience with information necessary for making self-governing decisions.
See Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy, supra note 4, at 59. Bloustein's theory
limits self-governing decisions to those of a governmental and political nature. Id. 46. A
more appropriate definition of legitimate public interest would also include matters of
economic and commercial significance on the theory that economic decisions are at least
as important to many individuals as political ones. See Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). This list of possibilities is not exhaustive;
the exact scope of the proper "legitimate public interest" test is not reached here.
202 One danger of such an approach, of course, lies in the fact that juries-and
even judges-may allow the two analyses to run together, letting the privateness of the
disclosure deflate the amount of public interest, or letting the nature of the public
interest-perhaps titillation rather than information-inflate the degree of privateness.
The danger of such commingling of the analyses, leading to a single balancing test, re-
quires caution in the administration of the suggested approach.
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